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'Cause online I'm out in Hollywood / I'm 6'5" and I look
damn good / I drive a Maserati / I'm a black-belt in
karate / And I love a good glass of wine... / 'Cause
even on a slow day, I could have a 3-way / Chat with
two women at one time / I'm so much cooler online ... /
When you got my kind of stats / It's hard to get a date /
Let alone a real girlfriend / But I grow another foot and
I lose a bunch of weight / Every time I login.
-Brad Paisley, Online'
I. INTRODUCTION
The desire to assume a false identity is one that transcends
cultures and time periods. Even the most socially confident and
successful person has, at some point, contemplated the possibility of
changing or masking his or her identity-if only temporarily-with
the hope of gaining some sort of competitive advantage. History and
popular culture are replete with instances of such conduct, with
varying degrees of success. One of the most famous historical
examples, originating in Greek mythology, is the legend of the Trojan
horse: the Greeks' surprise invasion of Troy using a hollow, wooden
horse.2
This same desire to gain a competitive edge by pretending to be
someone else likely contributed, at least indirectly, to the advent of
cybersquatting. Cybersquatting is "the act of reserving a domain
name," and then "seeking to profit by selling or licensing the name to
a company that has an interest in being identified with it." 3
Cybersquatters depend upon "initial interest confusion,"4 meaning
that they hope their use of domain names that are similar or identical
to well-known trademarks will be so confusing to the trademark
holders' customers that the trademark holders will be forced to
purchase the domain names from the cybersquatters. Cybersquatting
and the problems associated with it highlight some of the most
metaphysical questions surrounding legal problems in the Internet
world. For example, what does it mean to have an "identity" in
cyberspace? Which Brad Paisley is the real one: The short, insecure,
1. BRAD PAISLEY, Online, on 5TH GEAR (Arista Records 2007).
2. VIRGIL, THE AENEID 83-84 (Robert Fagles trans., Viking Press 2006).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 414 (8th ed. 2004).
4. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir.
1999).
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overweight man who (in reality) drives a Hyundai, lives with his
parents, and works in fast food, or the tall, debonair ladies' man who
drives an Italian sports car?5 Also, what are the rules associated with
property on the Internet? Where is a website "located"? Is it located on
a server somewhere, or is its location tied to the place of its creation or
impact? All or none of the above? These sorts of questions demonstrate
the confusion and perceived lawlessness upon which cybersquatters
have been able to capitalize.
By way of example, assume that two well-known, publicly
traded companies-the "John" and "Doe" corporations-have
announced their intent to merge, and a press release indicates that
the name of the new company will be "JOHNDOE Corporation." The
newly formed JOHNDOE Corporation subsequently applies for federal
trademark protection of its mark, "JOHNDOE." Less than one day
later, someone in China registers the domain name, <johndoe.com>,
before the JOHNDOE Corporation has a chance to do so. The
registrant has no connection to the names John, Doe, or JOHNDOE
through either his business or his personal life. However, his
registration of the <johndoe.com> domain name is a total barrier to
subsequent registration of that domain name by anyone else,
including the JOHNDOE Corporation. Consequently, the JOHNDOE
Corporation, despite owning the trademark "JOHNDOE," is unable to
use the domain name that consumers most likely would associate with
it unless it pays exorbitant fees to the cybersquatter.
The preceding hypothetical parallels the facts of
GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com ("GlobalSantaFe"),6 which
is the subject of much discussion in this Note. The facts of
GlobalSantaFe are remarkable for two reasons: (1) they recur with
alarming frequency in the United States, especially with regard to
foreign cybersquatters who are not subject to in personam 7 jurisdiction
anywhere in this country; and (2) U.S. trademark law itself provides
little assistance to the victims of such pusillanimous cybersquatters.8
In response to these growing concerns, Congress enacted the
5. See PAISLEY, supra note 1 (describing a fantasy alter-ego).
6. 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612-13 (E.D. Va. 2003).
7. In personam jurisdiction is jurisdiction over a person, as opposed to property. For a
more detailed explanation of the terminology of personal jurisdiction, see infra Part II.
8. See Heather A. Forrest, Drawing a Line in the Constitutional Sand Between Congress
and the Foreign Citizen "Cybersquatter," 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461, 462, 482 (2001) (citing
the "epidemic frequency" of claims against foreign cybersquatters in U.S. courts and the inability




Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"), 9 which
plaintiffs have used several times in exactly these types of actions-
including in GlobalSantaFe'°-in an attempt to rein in
cybersquatting.
The ACPA provides, inter alia, for the "owner of a mark" to file
a civil action against the holder of a domain name if the "domain name
violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office."' This provision is meaningless and unenforceable,
however, unless U.S. courts can obtain personal jurisdiction over the
alleged infringer (who often is located outside of the United States). To
that end, the ACPA has additional language that provides for in rem
jurisdiction over the domain name itself when the trademark holder is
unable to locate or obtain in personam jurisdiction against the alleged
infringer. 12 In other words, this provision of the ACPA showcases
Congress's intent to treat a domain name as a piece of property that
creates a jurisdictional nexus wherever it is "located." The net effect is
that although a plaintiff may not be able to find, sue, or even identify
the alleged cybersquatter, he may nonetheless bring an action to
determine the "true owner" of the domain name in the judicial district
in which the domain name is registered. 13 Because all <.com> and
<.net> domain names currently are registered in Northern Virginia,14
the in rem provision of the ACPA is the ultimate trump card for U.S.
plaintiffs suing foreign cybersquatters. This provision has been the
subject of much controversy and has engendered much opposition,
resulting in constitutional challenges to the ACPA.
Many scholars and theorists have particular difficulty
reconciling the ACPA's jurisdictional provision with the personal
jurisdiction contours articulated in International Shoe v. Washington
and its progeny.' 5 Although any first year law student in Civil
Procedure knows by heart the International Shoe requirement of
"minimum contacts" with the forum state, "such that maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice," 6 courts have struggled to apply it to the Internet. 17 Although
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
10. 250 F. Supp. 2d at 614-17.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(2)(A).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. For a complete understanding of the ACPA's provisions and its scope, see infra Part II
(including a more detailed explanation of the structure of the Internet).
15. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
16. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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the International Shoe Court formulated its test with in personam
jurisdiction in mind,18 the minimum contacts formula has been
interpreted broadly by U.S. courts for more than half a century and
now applies to all types of personal jurisdiction, including in rem
jurisdiction. 19 Consequently, scholars and courts express discomfort
with the ACPA's jurisdictional provision, 20 which some believe strains
due process. Additionally, the provision implicates potential comity
concerns 21 because the ACPA relies heavily upon U.S. trademark law.
Perhaps most troubling is the difficulty many courts and
commentators have reconciling the ACPA's provision for in rem
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, in
which the Court expanded the reach of the International Shoe test to
cover in rem actions in addition to in personam actions.
22
This Note argues that the in rem provision of the ACPA is
unconstitutional and should be considered an invalid exercise of
Congress's power because it represents this country's unlawful
stranglehold on legal regulation of the Internet. In particular, as
scholars David Johnson and David Post persuasively argue, "[N]o
physical jurisdiction has a more compelling claim than any other to
subject [Internet activities] exclusively to its laws."23 This is the so-
called "exceptionalist" view: activities on the Internet cannot be
governed by the traditional legal methods; consequently, successful
17. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(holding that the creator of a website is subject to personal jurisdiction in any jurisdiction where
such website's effects are felt, in accordance with a sliding scale of the nature and quality of the
commercial activity in which the website engages).
18. 326 U.S. at 316.
19. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (holding that the International Shoe
minimum contacts test is the inquiry that should be used to determine all types of personal
jurisdiction, not just in personam).
20. See, e.g., Forrest, supra note 8, at 462 (arguing that Congress lacks the power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate extraterritorial cybersquatters and other domain name offenders).
21. See GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 624-26 (E.D. Va.
2003) (describing the potential comity concerns that could result if U.S. courts exercise in rem
jurisdiction too aggressively over domain names). "Comity" refers to the general obligation that
political entities feel to recognize each other's legislative, executive, and judicial acts and
decisions. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (8th ed. 2004). With respect to the ACPA, the primary
comity concern is that other nations will view the United States as attempting to monopolize
global trademark law.
22. 433 U.S. at 207. It should be noted that many courts have interpreted Shaffer more
narrowly. See, e.g., Cable News Network L.P. v. Cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va.
2001) (holding that where "an action is properly categorized as 'true in rem,' there is no
requirement that the owner or claimant of the property have minimum contacts with the
forum").
23. David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1376 (1996).
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Internet regulation requires adapting laws and societal norms to the
Internet, not the other way around. 24 Exceptionalists would argue that
a provision such as the ACPA's provision for in rem jurisdiction is no
more effective or legitimate than ordering someone to fit a square peg
into a round hole. However, this Note does not advocate complete
cyberanarchy; a less extreme solution exists between such anarchy
and the ACPA's overreaching.
Part II of this Note explores the historical background of
Internet law and personal jurisdiction, and it provides a detailed
explanation of the structure and function of the Internet. In
particular, Part II explains the mechanism of domain name
registration, as well as procedures to cancel or transfer domain names.
Part II also explores the leading case law concerning cybersquatting
and the ACPA.
Part III analyzes the shortcomings and benefits of the existing
slate of judicial interpretations of the ACPA. However, this Note
should not be interpreted as arguing that nothing of value can be
salvaged from the ACPA or from ACPA jurisprudence. Instead, Part
III examines the positives and negatives of existing jurisprudence
with an eye towards formulating a compromise that has the potential
to be more effective and legitimate than any of the current options,
particularly because the ACPA's in rem provision represents
Congress's attempt to circumvent established personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence, and thereby, due process.
Part IV presents and elaborates upon this Note's proposed
solution, which advocates excising the in rem provision from the
ACPA and using a more traditional approach to establish personal
jurisdiction over domain names. In addition to being unwise,
Congress's enactment of the ACPA also was unnecessary because
much of the existing personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in this
country already is able to deal with domain name disputes
expeditiously and with the requisite degree of flexibility. Therefore,
Part IV advocates a return to the basics in the form of a juxtaposition
of the International Shoe minimum contacts test and the "effects" test
from Calder v. Jones.25 Finally, Part V offers some concluding
remarks.
24. David G. Post, Against 'Against Cyberanarchy," 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1365
(2002).
25. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).
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II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: THE ACPA, THE DOMAIN NAME
SYSTEM, AND SELECTED CASE LAW
Those unaccustomed to what might loosely be termed "Internet
Law" or "Cyberlaw" may be unaware of the danger that the factual
complexities can overwhelm the law. Indeed, it can be more difficult to
wrap one's head around the technology that underlies the regulations
and laws than to understand the laws themselves. The purpose of
Section A, therefore, is to demystify some aspects of the Internet-
particularly domain names and domain name registration. Because
the thesis of this Note relies so heavily upon the doctrine of personal
jurisdiction, Section B gives a brief review of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence in the United States, highlighting the most important
cases and trends in that area of the law. Sections C and D describe the
ACPA and selected ACPA case law, respectively.
A. The Domain Name System and Internet Architecture: The Internet
as a "Decoder Ring"
To explain the ACPA's regulation of domain names and
cybersquatting, it is necessary first to explain the mechanics of
domain name registration, the domain name system ("DNS"), and the
structure, or "architecture,"26 of the Internet.
At its most basic level, the DNS can be thought of as a giant
decoder ring, which is a device allowing only the sender and recipient
of a coded message to decipher the contents of the message, provided
that both the sender and recipient possess decoder rings with the
same code pattern. On the other hand, calling the DNS a "decoder"
ring is something of a misnomer, for if the message were not "encoded"
using the same code pattern, there would be nothing coherent to
decode; therefore, the DNS both encodes and decodes messages sent
between Internet users. That is, the DNS serves as the central
repository for encoding and decoding data transmitted between
computers. Computers and servers worldwide communicate with one
another through Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses, which consist of
four sequences of thirty-two-bit numbers that are unique to individual
computers and servers. 27 As a result, a computer's IP address is as
close as a computer gets to having a physical address; it is a unique
26. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV.
501, 509-10 (1999) (referring to the code or structure of the Internet as its "architecture").
27. This summary is an oversimplification of a rather complex process. For an in-depth
description of the process, see generally PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF
POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 167-71 (3rd ed. 2007).
2008] 1867
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identifier of a particular computer or server. However, because
humans are considerably less able to remember strings of numbers
than words, the DNS converts words into the numerical format of IP
addresses. For example, instead of typing "71.21.203.1,"28 one can type
"www.amazon.com" and reach the same webpage. Given the choice,
most people would find it much easier to type the name of the website
rather than the website's IP address, simply because it is much easier
to remember the name of an organization 29 than a string of numbers
that correspond to the website. To put it another way, imagine that
one could mail a letter to a friend who worked for Home Depot simply
by addressing the letter: "John Doe, Home Depot, Inc." This would be
a much easier way to send mail, compared to the process of searching
for street addresses and zip codes. The DNS is premised on the same
idea, espousing the viewpoint that it is much easier for Internet users
to type in words that automatically direct users to the website with
the corresponding IP address, rather than forcing users to remember
long strings of numbers. Domain name servers convert the domain
names into IP addresses so that users do not have to. The domain
servers perform a variety of blazing-fast calculations and functions to
match the domain name that a user enters in an Internet browser
with the corresponding IP address. All of this happens with
remarkable speed and efficiency, and as a general rule, the DNS
enables users to locate websites with ease.
The ease with which a user can locate a website, however,
depends upon several assumptions that cybersquatters exploit. Chief
among them is the assumption that typing <www.OrganizationName.
com> into one's web browser will lead to the webpage of Organization
Name. Although this assumption is correct in the case of many
organizations,3 0 it is not always accurate. The Sixth Circuit explained
the process of guessing an organization's domain name as follows:
An Internet user will often begin by guessing the domain name, especially if there is an
obvious domain name to try. Web users often correctly assume that the domain name of
a particular company's website will be the company name followed by ".com." Guessing
domain names, however, is not always successful. The web surfer who assumes that
'X.com" will always correspond to the website of company X will sometimes be misled.
3 1
28. It is important to note that Amazon.com periodically changes its IP address. Although it
is accurate as of the publication of this Note, it may change in the future.
29. For exemplary purposes, I refer to websites of organizations and businesses such as
Home Depot and Amazon because most people are familiar with them. However, all of these
examples and structural restrictions apply equally to personal websites.
30. For instance, Amazon's website is <www.amazon.com>, and Home Depot's is
<www.homedepot.com>.
31. Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 691 (6th Cir.
2003).
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This is largely a product of the Internet's "architecture, 32
which is structured such that every domain name is unique. That is,
in the entire Internet, there can exist only one "<homedepot.com>" or
one "<amazon.com>." Once such a domain name has been registered,
the holder of the registration "owns" that domain name to the
exclusion of everyone else on the Internet. In other words, the minute
that Amazon registered the domain name <amazon.com>, it had
exclusive rights to establish a website at that domain name. Just as
two organizations cannot occupy the exact same physical space, they
also cannot occupy the same domain name space.
At this point, it is appropriate to explain what it means to
"register" a domain name. Registration begins with the specific top-
level domain ("TLD"). Examples of familiar TLDs include <.com>,
<.net>, <.org>, <.edu>, and the TLDs that serve as "country codes,"
such as <.uk> for the United Kingdom and <.fr> for France. Domain
name registration is accomplished through two separate, but
confusingly similar, entities: the registry and the registrar.33 For every
domain name to be unique, there must be some entity controlling the
system to prevent duplicates. Accordingly, a registry manages all the
domain names within each TLD to prevent duplication. For example,
for every website ending in <.com>, the registry is VeriSign, a private
company located in Virginia. This single registry, however, is not to be
confused with registrars, of which there are many under the control of
each registry, and which are authorized to register domain names for
users.34 Therefore, if an organization or individual wishes to register
and use a <.com> domain name, it contacts one of the many registrars,
which then sends the relevant information to the registry in
Virginia.
35
Given the fact that every domain name must be unique, it is
easy to see how cybersquatting occurs. A person or entity attempts to
register a domain name that is the same as, or confusingly similar to,
32. Lessig, supra note 26, at 509-10.
33. There are several "registrars" within each TLD, and they generally are located around
the world. By contrast, there is but one "registry" for each TLD. BELLIA ET AL., supra note 27, at
167-68. To complicate things even more, each registry is also a registrar (but not vice-versa).
That is, people who want to register domain names usually accomplish this through registrars,
and registries oversee all of the registrars within their TLDs. An analogy may be helpful to
illustrate this relationship. Assume domain name registrants are law students, registrars are
law professors, and the registry is the dean of the law school. In general, students take classes
from their professors, and the dean oversees the activities of the professors. In the alternative,
the dean may teach classes in addition to the oversight role. Law professors other than the dean,
however, do not double as law school administrators.




a registered trademark, a well-known brand, or a company name, and
it then attempts to extort money out of the trademark holder in return
for relinquishing the domain name. Cybersquatting that occurs
entirely within the United States (i.e. both the cybersquatter and the
trademark holder are located within the United States) is relatively
easy to regulate; combating such domestic cybersquatting presents
fewer problems than extraterritorial cybersquatting. Because of the
ease with which it can be stopped, however, domestic cybersquatting
is less common than extraterritorial cybersquatting. Therefore,
geography and the physical locations of registries and registrars factor
prominently into the ACPA and ACPA jurisprudence. In particular,
the fact that the registries for the two most common TLDs, <.com>
and <.net>, are located in Virginia gives the ACPA considerably more
teeth than it otherwise would have. Yet it also arguably subjects
foreign cybersquatters and all foreign entities wishing to register
<.com> and <.net> TLDs to U.S. trademark law. For this and other
reasons, the in rem provision of the ACPA is unconstitutional,
primarily because it violates decades-old notions of personal
jurisdiction. Therefore, it is helpful at this point as a matter of
contrast to explore briefly the evolution of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence in the United States as a prelude to further discussion
of the ACPA, namely because the existing personal jurisdiction
framework provides the foundation upon which the ACPA has been so
awkwardly (and unconstitutionally) positioned.
B. "Minimum Contacts"." A Brief Overview of United States Personal
Jurisdiction Jurisprudence
Personal jurisdiction refers to the procedural manifestation of
constitutional due process. Specifically, personal jurisdiction
determines whether the assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant by a
court in a particular state is consistent with due process under the
Constitution. Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction
affects both state and federal courts equally because personal
jurisdiction follows state lines and state sovereignty. Thus, for
example, if one is subject to personal jurisdiction in the State of Ohio,
then, consistent with due process, one can be haled into any state or
federal court in that state, provided that the particular venue is
convenient.
Traditionally, personal jurisdiction has been determined by one
of two primary factors: the defendant's presence in the forum state or
his consent to being sued there. Loosely, a defendant's "presence" in
the forum state has to do with the nature and frequency of his contact
1870 [Vol. 61:6:1861
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with the state. A defendant can be present in a state if he lives there,
owns property there, works there, votes there, or is served with
process there.36 "Consent" essentially refers to the willingness of a
defendant to appear in court to answer the complaint, or to a
defendant's "purposefully avail[ing]" himself of the forum state by use
of its laws or resources. 37 The foregoing is not an exhaustive list, but it
illustrates the difficulty and potential breadth of the presence and
consent requirements and emphasizes the fact that state law
boundaries form the basis for personal jurisdiction. Indeed, the most
likely reason for making state boundaries the essential, delineating
feature of personal jurisdiction is that during personal jurisdiction's
infancy, travel beyond one's state borders required much more of a
commitment than it does now. Therefore, the relevant query is
entirely geographic: "Is it consistent with due process to permit this
defendant to be sued in this state?"
Three types of personal jurisdiction exist: in personam, in rem,
and quasi in rem. These will be explored fully below, 38 but at bottom,
in personam suits are those-such as contract suits, negligence suits,
etc.-where a wrong committed by one person against another forms
the basis for jurisdiction. By contrast, in rem and quasi in rem suits
involve property and disputed property rights as bases for jurisdiction.
Although this Note primarily addresses in rem and quasi in rem
jurisdiction, the concepts underlying these and in personam
jurisdiction basically are the same.
The linchpin of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is
International Shoe v. Washington.39 Although there have been
significant developments in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence both
prior and subsequent to the International Shoe decision, 40 it remains
the focal point of personal jurisdiction doctrine in the United States.
In International Shoe, the defendant was a Delaware corporation with
no offices or operations in the State of Washington, save for the fact
that a small number of its salesmen lived and worked there.41 The
36. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (holding that
service of process in the forum state is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the
defendant).
37. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
38. See infra Sections II.D, III (describing the varied approaches courts have taken in
evaluating the ACPA).
39. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
40. Some of the other important personal jurisdiction opinions will be discussed further as
they become relevant in subsequent sections of this Note. See infra Sections II.D, III (analyzing
the decisions in GlobalSantaFe, Shaffer v. Heitner, and Cable News Network L.P. v.
Cnnews.com).
41. 326 U.S. at 313-14.
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defendant claimed that because the corporation itself was not
physically located in Washington, its activities in that state were
insufficient to manifest its presence there, and thus, it was
inconsistent with due process for it to be sued there.42 The Supreme
Court disagreed, finding that if a person or entity is not otherwise
"present" in the forum state, "due process requires only that... he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "43 The Court reasoned that the corporation's "presence" in
Washington could be manifested by the activities of its agents, insofar
as those activities could make it reasonable to subject the corporation
to suit in that state.44 Because the corporation "exercise[d] the
privilege of conducting activities" in Washington, it enjoyed the
benefits and protections of Washington's laws, and therefore was
subject to the corresponding burdens of those laws.
45
The Court in International Shoe also articulated the difference
between general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. General
jurisdiction refers to "systematic and continuous" contacts in a state
that make it reasonable that a defendant be "amenable to suits
unrelated to that activity."46 By contrast, specific jurisdiction comes
into play when an entity's contacts with a state are so casual or
isolated that the entity is subject to suit only for claims directly
arising from those activities.
47
For example, consider Jane, a hypothetical woman who is
"domiciled" in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. She resides, works,
pays taxes, votes, and maintains bank accounts only in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. Because of her continuous and
systematic contacts with Kentucky (that is, she is constantly "present"
in Kentucky, even when physically absent from Kentucky for brief
periods of time), Jane can be sued in Kentucky courts-state or
federal-by anyone for any claim, regardless of where the activities
that caused the harm occurred. In other words, if Jane negligently
injures Bob while she is vacationing in Texas, he may sue her in
Kentucky because Kentucky has general jurisdiction over her for any
claim that may be brought against her.
42. Id. at 315.
43. Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
44. Id. at 316-17.
45. Id. at 319.
46. Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 317-18.
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Conversely, Bob also may choose to sue Jane in Texas for his
injury because Texas has specific jurisdiction over Jane for claims
arising out of her contact with Texas. However, Texas only has
jurisdiction over Jane for claims arising out of her negligence that
injured Bob in Texas; this specific jurisdiction does not subject Jane to
suits in Texas arising from activities elsewhere. For instance, Texas
would not have jurisdiction over Jane for a claim against her by
another Kentucky resident who has never left Kentucky, or for a claim
by an Indiana merchant that Jane is delinquent in paying her bills.
Texas's personal jurisdiction over Jane is specific to her activities
within its state lines and extends no further, whereas Kentucky has
general jurisdiction over Jane for any claim, even if such a claim also
could be brought in another state.
After International Shoe, there have been several other
important personal jurisdiction decisions that warrant brief
discussion, particularly Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com, which
dealt with personal jurisdiction over a website.48 It is important to
note, however, that the International Shoe requirement that a
defendant have "minimum contacts with the forum state, such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice"49 (the "minimum contacts test"), remains the
dominant inquiry for personal jurisdiction analyses, even though some
of the subsequent jurisprudence at times appears to supplant it. That
is to say, the case law that this Note sets forth should be read only as
an augmentation or elaboration of the minimum contacts test, not as a
new analytical framework for determining personal jurisdiction. The
minimum contacts test is the bedrock of personal jurisdiction doctrine,
and the subsequent cases-though they may appear to be new or
different-should not be read as inconsistent with the minimum
contacts test.
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, a products liability action in which the Court found personal
jurisdiction to be improper.50 In this case, two people filed suit in
Oklahoma against World-Wide Volkswagen (hereinafter "World-
Wide")-a New York corporation doing business only in New York,
Connecticut, and New Jersey-after they were injured by a fire that
resulted when their car was struck from behind. 51 Using the minimum
contacts test, the Court found that subjecting World-Wide to personal
48. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1119-20 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
49. 326 U.S. at 316.
50. 444 U.S. 286, 288-91 (1980).
51. Id. at 288.
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jurisdiction in Oklahoma would offend the "fairness" part of the test;
the Court found that World-Wide had insufficient contacts with the
State of Oklahoma and did not avail itself of the privileges of
Oklahoma law.52 The Court also rejected the argument that
jurisdiction would be fair just because it was "foreseeable" that the car
might be driven from New York to Oklahoma.53 Although
foreseeability is a factor in the minimum contacts test, the more
important inquiry was whether or not World-Wide had intentionally
"deliver[ed] its products into the stream of commerce" in Oklahoma,
and the Court found that it had not.54 World-Wide Volkswagen and
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California55 are best
known for establishing the "stream-of-commerce" basis for
jurisdiction, which holds that placing an item in the stream of
commerce with the expectation that it will end up in the forum state
can be sufficient to establish minimum contacts.
Last, and perhaps most relevant to this Note, is the case of
Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com, in which the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania articulated a sliding
scale for determining where the proprietor of a website is subject to
personal jurisdiction. 56 Specifically, the court provided a test analyzing
the nature and function of a website to determine the degree of
interactivity between the site and its users that is necessary to
constitute purposeful availment of the forum state.57 At one end of the
spectrum are "active" websites, or those that "clearly [do] business
over the [I]nternet."58 At the other end are "passive" websites, or sites
on which the defendant posts information that is merely accessible in
the forum state.59 The middle ground is comprised of "interactive"
websites, which allow users to exchange information with the host
computer. 60  Ultimately, jurisdiction hinges upon the level of
interactivity and the commercial nature of the website.
61
These tests leave many questions as to the legitimacy of
personal jurisdiction over a website or a domain name. For example,
how does one know where a domain name is "present"? Is the use of a
52. Id. at 295.
53. Id. at 296-97.
54. Id. at 297-98.
55. 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
57. Id. at 1125-26.
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domain name the same as placing an article into the stream of
commerce? Under the Zippo sliding-scale test, how does one know
when a website is interactive enough such that personal jurisdiction
does not offend due process? By passing the ACPA, Congress
attempted to clarify some of these jurisdictional questions. To
illustrate the influence the ACPA has over extraterritorial matters, it
is necessary to undertake a more detailed analysis of both the ACPA
and some of the more famous litigation emanating from it.
C. Congress Attempts to Provide a Solution: The ACPA
Perhaps recognizing the vastness of the threat posed by
cybersquatting and "cyberpiracy," 62 Congress passed the ACPA in an
attempt to provide some measure of protection to domestic trademark
holders against foreign cybersquatters. The ACPA provides for civil
liability when someone other than the mark holder acts with a "bad
faith intent to profit from that mark"63 or uses a domain name that is
confusingly similar to or dilutive of a famous, or otherwise registered,
mark.64 This test necessarily requires a threshold examination under
trademark law to determine whether the domain name in question is
confusingly similar to or dilutive of a famous mark.65
As a remedy, the ACPA provides for "forfeiture or cancellation
of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner
of the mark."66 This may be a draconian solution, but a remedy that is
less than cancellation or forfeiture may be, in many instances, a
toothless one: "[Merely] disabling the domain name will have minimal
practical effect-the trademark holder still will not be able to use the
domain name, and the cybersquatter can continue squatting on the
domain name as long as he keeps the registration active."67
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
63. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). In determining what constitutes bad faith, courts have broad
discretion to evaluate a number of factors, including, but not limited to: (1) the mark holder's use
of the domain name; (2) the alleged infringer's prior use of the domain name; (3) the intent of the
alleged infringer to divert goods and services away from the mark holder; (4) the alleged
infringer's false or misleading conduct; (5) the alleged infringer's offer to sell the domain name to
the mark holder; (6) and the alleged infringer's registration of several domain names, all of
which are confusingly similar to famous or registered marks. Id. §§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(IX). Bad
faith intent cannot be found where a court determines that the alleged infringer reasonably
believed his or her use of the domain name "was a fair use or otherwise lawful." Id. §
1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
64. Id. §§ 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I)-(II).
65. See id. §§ 1125(a)-(c) (setting forth the tests for dilution and "confusingly similar"
marks).
66. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(C).
67. GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 622 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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The ACPA "effectively globalizes its scope,"68 however, through
its provision for in rem jurisdiction over an alleged foreign
cybersquatter. The Act provides that "the owner of a mark" may file
an in rem action in the judicial district in which either the registry or
the registrar for that domain name resides.6 9 Although registrars are
located all over the world, the registries for both the <.com> and
<.net> TLDs are in Virginia. 70 The practical effect of this provision,
therefore, is to allow almost any aggrieved mark holder-at least
those who seek cancellation of an infringing <.com> or <.net> domain
name-to file an in rem action in Virginia, regardless of the location of
the alleged infringer or the location of the registrar that initially
registered the domain name. However, in rem jurisdiction is only
available if the mark owner "is not able to obtain in personam
jurisdiction"71 over the alleged infringer or is unable to locate the
alleged infringer "through due diligence."72 In other words, the ACPA's
provision for in rem jurisdiction would be inapplicable if a U.S. mark
holder sued the U.S. registrant of an allegedly infringing domain
name; the in rem provision kicks in only if there is no U.S. judicial
district that has in personam jurisdiction over the alleged
cybersquatter. 7
3
Once a U.S. district court receives a complaint, the registrar or
registry is ordered to transfer ownership of the domain name to the
court pending the outcome of the litigation, and in any event, the
registrar or registry may not "transfer, suspend, or otherwise modify
the domain name during the pendency of the action."74 Finally, the
ACPA insulates the registrar or registry against liability for monetary
or injunctive damages unless "bad faith or reckless" disregard for the
rights of others can be shown.
75
Essentially, the ACPA provides that the disputed property in
the in rem action (the domain name) is "located" wherever it has been
registered-either through the registrar or registry. That locational
provision is sufficient to provide jurisdiction even where there is no in
personam jurisdiction over the alleged infringer. The difficulties
inherent in reconciling this controversial provision with both the Due
Process Clause and the minimum contacts test from International
68. BELLIA ETAL., supra note 27, at 170.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
70. BELLIA ET AL., supra note 27, at 168.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
72. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
73. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(J).
74. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i)(IJ).
75. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(ii).
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Shoe are highlighted by the opinions in GlobalSantaFe, Shaffer v.
Heitner, and Cnnews.
D. Different Strokes: The Varied Approaches Courts Have Taken in
Evaluating the ACPA
The case law surrounding the ACPA is problematic at best.
What follows here is a brief cross-section of what some courts have
said about the ACPA and its provision for in rem jurisdiction. In
particular, this Section includes some of the more common rationales
courts have concocted for upholding the offending provision of the
ACPA, and it lays the foundation for showcasing the inadequacies of
these rationales. 76 The first case, GlobalSantaFe,77 is a good
introduction to ACPA jurisprudence because it illustrates both a
recurring ACPA factual scenario and a common set of justifications
courts advance for upholding the ACPA. The second case discussed is
Shaffer v. Heitner.78 Although it predates and thus does not speak
directly to the legitimacy of the ACPA, Shaffer is nonetheless vitally
important in the context of the ACPA because it represents the
Supreme Court's attempt to broaden the reach of the minimum
contacts test.79 Discussions of Shaffer in the Cable News Network L.P.
v. Cnnews.com80 and Harrods v. Sixty Internet Domain Names81
opinions reinforce its importance to ACPA jurisprudence. Finally, this
Note's discussion of Cnnews and Harrods illustrates the lengths to
which some courts have gone in attempting to distance the ACPA's in
rem provision from the jurisdictional test that the Supreme Court
prescribed in International Shoe.8 2
76. Obviously, the ACPA cases that this Note discusses represent only a fraction of the
extant ACPA jurisprudence, and were chosen because of their relatively comprehensive
discussions of the ACPA's in rem provision. However, for more examples of courts' applications of
the ACPA and its elements generally, see, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001)
(affirming the lower court's judgment that defendant Zuccarini had violated the ACPA and its
award of statutory damages and attorneys' fees); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding, inter alia, that the ACPA was meant to apply
retroactively, and that proving partial bad faith is sufficient to make out a prima facie case
under the ACPA).
77. 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
78. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
79. See id. at 212 (establishing minimum contacts as the test for all assertions of personal
jurisdiction).
80. 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 489-92 (E.D. Va. 2001).
81. 302 F.3d 214, 224-25 (4th Cir. 2004).
82. See infra Section II.D.3.
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1. GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com ("GlobalSantaFe")8 3
GlobalSantaFe represents the "typical" form that ACPA in rem
actions can take and some of the complications that can arise in the
course of such litigation. "GlobalSantaFe" was to be the name of a new
company that was formed by the consolidation of two companies,
Global Marine and Santa Fe.8 4 Less than one day after the companies
announced their merger and that the merged company would be
named "GlobalSantaFe," Jongsun Park registered "globalsantafe.com"
with a Korean registrar-Hangang-and Park subsequently
transferred the domain name to another Korean entity.8 5
GlobalSantaFe then filed an ACPA suit in Virginia. Because Park
failed to appear, the court was prepared to enter a default judgment
and transfer the domain name to GlobalSantaFe.8 6 Hangang had
previously deposited the registrar certificate for the domain name
with the court in accordance with ACPA's mandates,8 7 but Park
subsequently filed for an injunction in Korea to stop the transfer of the
domain name.88 Relying on the Korean court's holding that the U.S.
court "likely lacked jurisdiction over the matter," Hangang refused to
transfer the domain name. 89
The U.S. court first undertook an analysis of whether the
ACPA's in rem provision applied-that is, whether it was possible for
GlobalSantaFe to get in personam jurisdiction over Park. 90 This initial
inquiry was necessary since the in rem provision does not apply unless
the plaintiff is unable to get in personam jurisdiction over the alleged
infringer.91 The court concluded that in personam jurisdiction over
Park did not exist; in fact, the court found that, "while it is true that
the infringing domain name is included in the VeriSign [Virginia]
registry, this is not enough to establish minimum contacts" under
International Shoe.92 The court then determined that, based on a
number of factors, Park's registration of the domain name was "in
response to... GlobalSantaFe's use of the.., mark in its merger
announcement," and thus, "the registration of <globalsantafe.com>
83. 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
84. Id. at 612-13.
85. Id. at 613.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 614; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i)(1) (2000).
88. GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 614.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 615.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
92. GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
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was in clear violation of the ACPA, and GlobalSantaFe is accordingly
entitled to transfer or cancellation of the domain name. 93
The court then examined the different remedies available to
GlobalSantaFe, concluding that although it could order VeriSign
simply to disable the domain name or render it inactive, doing so
would provide GlobalSantaFe with little relief: "[I]f the domain name
<globalsantafe.com> were disabled in this manner, individual
users... would receive an error message indicating that the domain
name could not be found, yet GlobalSantaFe could not register the
domain name for its own use because it would still be registered by
Park... ,,94 Over VeriSign's vehement opposition, the court ultimately
ordered VeriSign to cancel the domain name unilaterally without
cooperation from the registrar-an unorthodox procedure to say the
least. 95 Although the court recognized the contractual relationships
between VeriSign and the various registries, as well as the methods
that registrars prefer to use in solving disputes, it ultimately
concluded that GlobalSantaFe's trademark rights trumped VeriSign's
contracts with its registrars. 96 Even though less extreme remedies-
such as disabling by the registry or direct disabling or cancellation by
the registrar-are preferable in these situations, the court found that
the ACPA authorizes this direct, court-ordered cancellation at the
registry level.
97
The court's opinion took on a cautionary tone, however,
acknowledging that the broad reach of the ACPA for U.S. plaintiffs is
attributable to the <.com> and <.net> registries being located in the
United States. 98 The court predicted that if U.S. jurisdiction were
asserted aggressively in these types of domain name disputes, a
backlash could come in the form of "competing systems" founded
outside of the United States that would serve as rivals to United
States-based registrars. 99 Ultimately, the court admitted that overly
aggressive pursuit of ACPA in rem jurisdiction could "pose a serious
93. Id. at 616.
94. Id. at 621.
95. Id. at 622.
96. Id. at 622-23.
97. Id. at 623. Specifically, the language in the ACPA that supports this conclusion reads:
'The remedies in an in rem action under this paragraph shall be limited to a court order for the
forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of
the mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) (2000).
98. GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
99. Id. at 624.
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challenge to the enforcement of United States trademark rights on the
Internet." 00
Finally, the court dispensed with the issue of potential comity
problems rather easily, citing "longstanding precedent and practice" in
which "the first court seized of jurisdiction over property ... may
exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court."101
Finding that it had exercised jurisdiction over this domain name
before Park sought an injunction in Korea, the court held that it was
"not obligated ... to cede jurisdiction over the domain name in light of
the subsequent order issued by the Korean court."'1 2 This case
illustrates the fact that a court that precisely follows the ACPA
nevertheless faces a difficult task in justifying its decision.
2. Shaffer v. Heitner ("Shaffer")103
In Shaffer, the Supreme Court articulated the expansive
nature of the International Shoe minimum contacts test long before
the enactment of the ACPA.104 Although it predates the ACPA, Shaffer
is an important link between the Court's International Shoe decision
and its current personal jurisdiction jurisprudence because the ACPA
appears to be at odds with Shaffer's holding.
Shaffer involved a shareholder derivative action in Delaware
that alleged that the board of directors had breached its fiduciary
duty. 105 The plaintiff simultaneously filed a motion for sequestration
of the Delaware property (i.e. the stock certificates) of the individual
defendants, 10 6 none of whom were Delaware residents. 107 In response,
the defendants argued, inter alia, that they did not have sufficient
minimum contacts with Delaware under International Shoe to sustain
that state's personal jurisdiction over them or their property.0 8
Noting that the suit was brought as a quasi in rem proceeding,
the Delaware state court held that because the property in question
was situated in Delaware, minimum contacts with the state were
otherwise unimportant. 109 The Supreme Court disagreed. Citing
100. Id. at 624.
101. Id. (citing SEC v. Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602, 611 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
102. Id. at 625.
103. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
104. Id. at 207-16.
105. Id. at 189-90.
106. The property included stocks, options, warrants, etc. Id. at 191.
107. Id. at 190-91.
108. Id. at 193.
109. Id. at 195.
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Pennoyer v. Neff" ° and International Shoe, the Court concluded that
"all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according
to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."11'
After a lengthy analysis of the consequences of such a holding,
including its impact upon relevant precedent, the Court concluded
that "jurisdiction over many types of actions which now are or might
be brought in rem would not be affected by a holding that any
assertion of state-court jurisdiction must satisfy the International
Shoe standard." 1 2 However, the Court also was mindful of the fact
that "the presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of
jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the
defendant, and the litigation."'131 Although the Court held in this case
that minimum contacts are required even in in rem suits, it also
recognized the strong possibility that in many in rem actions, the
presence of the property in the forum state might suffice as a
minimum contact.11 4 In this particular instance, however, the Court
found that Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction over the appellants
based solely on the presence of property in that state was inconsistent
with International Shoe's limitations on state jurisdictional power. 115
Because the Supreme Court has not revisited the issue, both those
who believe in the constitutionality of the in rem provision of the
ACPA and those who do not cite Shaffer for support.11 6
Shaffer is analyzed in much more detail in Part III. For now, it
is sufficient to note that, at the very least, the decision provides a little
more support to those who argue that the ACPA's blanket provision
for in rem jurisdiction is inconsistent with due process.
110. Pennoyer, which prescribed the test for personal jurisdiction before International Shoe,
held that personal jurisdiction over a defendant required that the defendant be a resident of the
forum state, be served with process there, or consent to be sued there. 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
Because none of those applied to the defendant, the Court dismissed the claim for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 736.
111. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 208.
113. Id. at 207.
114. Id. at 207-08.
115. Id. at 216-17.
116. See Michael P. Allen, In Rem Jurisdiction from Pennoyer to Shaffer to the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 243, 258-65 (explaining
how both the "narrowest conception" and the "broader view" of the reach of the minimum
contacts test find support within the Shaffer opinion).
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3. Cable News Network L.P. v. Cnnews.com ("Cnnews")117
The Cnnews decision is most notable for providing a distinction
between the ACPA's provision for in rem jurisdiction and the Shaffer
holding that all questions of jurisdiction must involve the "minimum
contacts" analysis from International Shoe. Cnnews involved a dispute
between the Cable News Network ("CNN") in the United States and
the Maya Online Broadband Network Company in China ("Maya").
118
CNN is, of course, a familiar news network, and its prominent,
eponymous website is <www.cnn.com>.11 9  CNN has used its
trademark "CNN" "[s]ince at least 1980."120 Maya's website was
designed to "provide news and information to Chinese-speaking
individuals worldwide," and it registered the domain name
"<cnnews.com>" in 1999 with Network Solutions Inc., which was an
organization in Virginia that was both a registrar and registry.12 '
After learning of Maya's use of the "cnnews" domain name, CNN
contacted Maya and demanded that it stop using the domain name
and transfer it to CNN. 122 Maya refused, and CNN initiated an ACPA
in rem action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia against the domain name. 123 The court found that
"cn" is a prefix denoting the fact that this is a Chinese website, and
that the "<cnnews.com>" domain name was linked to Maya's main
website, which was "<cnmaya.com>."'
124
After deciding that in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA was
proper, the court then turned to the difficult task of reconciling such
jurisdiction with Shaffer, analyzing whether the ACPA's in rem
provision is consistent with due process.1 25 The court outlined three
types of in rem jurisdiction. The first is what the court called "true in
rem." This is the type of action in which a court determines the true
117. 162 F. Supp. 2d 484 (E.D. Va. 2001) [hereinafter Cnnews.com 1], aff'd in relevant part,
56 F. App'x 599 (4th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Cnnews.com II].
118. 162 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 486-87. Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") was the precursor to the agency that is
now VeriSign. Id. at 486 n.5. Maya subsequently transferred the registration of the domain
name to Eastcom, a Chinese registrar, meaning that Maya's only contact with NSI was due to
NSI being the <.com> registry. Cnnews.com II, 56 F. App'x at 601. This proved to be of little
consequence, however, because Eastcom willingly complied with ACPA's requirement that the
registrar transfer the domain name in question to the court until the in rem litigation concluded.
Id. at 602.
122. Cnnews.com II, 56 F. App'x at 601.
123. Id. at 601-02.
124. Cnnews.com 1, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
125. Id. at 489.
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owner of a piece of property against everyone else in the world,
regardless of whether the true owner is involved in the suit.126 The
court said that "ACPA in rem actions, including the case at bar, are of
the 'true in rem' genre because they involve the rights of a disputed
mark for every potential rights holder."127 The second type of in rem
action is what the court labeled "quasi in rem I."128 This type of in rem
action determines the true owner of a disputed piece of property, but
only among the people involved in the suit.'
29
The third type of in rem action is a "quasi in rem II" action,
which differs from the other two because the underlying claim is
unrelated to the property that gives rise to in rem jurisdiction. 130 For
example, the court mentioned Shaffer, in which the underlying
shareholders' derivative action was unrelated to the property that
served as the basis for personal jurisdiction (the stock certificates
owned by the managers of the corporation). 13 1 The Cnnews court held
that "the language of Shaffer requires minimum contacts only for
quasi in rem II-type cases," 132 while acknowledging that other courts
have interpreted Shaffer as requiring minimum contacts in all types
of in rem actions.1 33 The Cnnews court, therefore, decided the action in
a manner that it deemed "consistent" with other district courts that
found nothing unconstitutional about establishing in rem jurisdiction
in the district in which the registry is located.
134
Finally, the Fourth Circuit found the ACPA's in rem provision
constitutional in Harrods v. Sixty Internet Domain Names
("Harrods").135 In particular, the Harrods court said that in disputes
involving property, "the presence of the property in the jurisdiction
does not always justify the exercise of in rem jurisdiction, but 'when
claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying





131. Id. (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 193 (1977)).
132. Id. at 491.
133. Id.; see Fleetboston Fin. Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 133-34
(D. Mass. 2001) (stating that Shaffer and the Fourteenth Amendment should be read "to prohibit
all in rem jurisdiction except when the person whose property rights are being extinguished has
had 'minimum contacts' with the forum state" (quoting Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945))).
134. 162 F. Supp. 2d. at 491.
135. 302 F.3d 214, 225 (4th Cir. 2002). The Fourth Circuit also found that the ACPA's in rem
provision was constitutional in another opinion. Porsche Cars N. Am. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d
248, 259-60 (4th Cir. 2002). Contra Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va.
2000) (holding that domain names themselves are not property).
2008] 1883
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
controversy ... it would be unusual for the State where the property is
located not to have jurisdiction.' "136 The court went on to find that a
defendant that registers its domain name in the forum state has
" 'purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws.' "137 Moreover, the court alluded to the interest of the forum
state-in this case, Virginia-in protecting property within its
borders. 138 Finding that the registration of domain names in Virginia
"exposed those Names to the jurisdiction of the courts in Virginia
(state or federal)," and that claims to the underlying property were
central to the controversy, the court held that it was proper for it to
exercise in rem jurisdiction over the domain names.
139
III. THE IRRECONCILABILITY OF THE ACPA AND DUE PROCESS
The foregoing is merely a microcosm of a much larger debate
surrounding some of the more controversial aspects of the ACPA.
Perhaps the most hotly debated topic is the availability of in rem
jurisdiction over extraterritorial infringers. First, there is an obvious
difficulty in reconciling the attempts by the Harrods and Cnnews
courts to distinguish their holdings and factual situations from those
articulated in Shaffer. That is, the Cnnews and Harrods courts
seemed willing to draw a rather tenuous distinction among various
types of in rem jurisdiction, which could be characterized as an
avoidance of the plain language of Shaffer's holding that both in rem
and in personam jurisdiction must be based on minimum contacts
with the forum state.140 As a result, it is necessary to ask whether
domain name registration in a judicial district, without more, is
sufficient to constitute "purposeful availment" within that jurisdiction
such that the minimum contacts standard is satisfied. 141 This Note
argues that it is not and that, consequently, assertion of in rem
jurisdiction without minimum contacts is inconsistent with due
process.
Second, there is the very real possibility that in rem
jurisdiction as it currently exists is simply too problematic to serve as
a valid basis for jurisdiction. Perhaps it ought to be abolished,
particularly because, "[iun cases where the assertion of in personam
136. Harrods, 302 F.3d at 224 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207).
137. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
138. Id. at 225.
139. Id.
140. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208.
141. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
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jurisdiction would violate due process, the assertion of in rem
jurisdiction would likewise be unconstitutional."'142 Also, if U.S. courts
were to cease recognizing in rem jurisdiction, the offending provision
of the ACPA would lose its effectiveness.
Finally, perhaps the most serious consequence of allowing for
in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA is the perceived globalization of
U.S. trademark law. The aggressive assertion of in rem jurisdiction
over extraterritorial defendants effectively makes U.S. trademark law
the law of Internet domain names, which raises questions of comity
and conflict of laws. For example, if U.S. trademark law in the form of
the ACPA is used to assert jurisdiction over a defendant from Spain-
and thereby to find such defendant guilty of cybersquatting-there
likely would be widespread outrage at the United States's perceived
overreaching. More importantly, as the GlobalSantaFe court
recognized, 143 continued pursuit of foreign defendants in U.S. courts
could well lead to an international backlash; organizations in other
countries may develop competing systems that would negate the many
advantages that the United States derives from having the <.com>
and <.net> registries located within its borders.
A. Threshold Questions: How Can We Classify The Internet?
Before these issues are evaluated fully, it is necessary to
explore two threshold matters: First, are domain names "property,"
and if so, where are they "located"? Second, which is the better
ideology when it comes to regulation of the Internet: exceptionalism or
unexceptionalism?
Inherent in the reasoning behind the ACPA is the assumption
that domain names themselves are property subject to jurisdiction and
regulation. The very fact that the ACPA provides for in rem
jurisdiction over domain names indicates that Congress meant for
domain names to be treated as property interests.144 However, such an
assumption raises several questions. If domain names are property,
how should courts classify such property? What characteristics of
domain names, which are intangible property, make them comparable
to real property or chattels, which are tangible things that can be
"owned"?
142. Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace: Problems
with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1006 (2002).
143. 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 624 (E.D. Va. 2003).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000).
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Certainly, the idea of intangible property is nothing new. Many
companies' most valuable assets are their brand loyalties, copyrights,
service marks, patents, trade secrets, and trademarks; these things
often are lumped together under the umbrella of "intellectual
property."'145 Because domain names (particularly in the case of
cyberpiracy and cybersquatting) are linked to trademarks and service
marks-which logically are considered property-then domain name
manifestations of these trademarks should be considered property. If
property rights and incidents of ownership inhere in trademark or any
other intellectual property ownership, then it is fair to extend the
parameters of "property" to include domain names, which often are
similar or identical to actual trademarks (e.g. Home DepotTM =
<www.homedepot.com>).
More complicated still is determining where this domain name
property is located. The entire concept of personal jurisdiction is based
upon territory and geography, which makes Internet regulation
inherently difficult. 146 Therefore, it is important to realize first that
"the geographic location of the domain name system is essentially
arbitrary."'147 The ACPA's in rem provision assumes that "a domain
name is located in the United States whenever [its TLD registry] is
U.S.-based,"148 which presupposes that all domain names are "located"
wherever the registry for their TLDs is located.1 49 This is but one of
many possibilities for the "location" of a domain name, however.
Congress just as easily could have picked any of several other
locations, including the servers of the entity that operates the
particular website; the location of the "root servers," through which
domain names are matched with corresponding IP addresses; 50 or
perhaps most convincingly, the focal point of the harm per the effects
test from Calder v. Jones, which is explored in much more detail
below. 15' For now, the point is that because a domain name exists
simultaneously everywhere and nowhere, its "location" is at best
indeterminate and arbitrary. Thus, Congress's declaration in the form
of the ACPA that domain names are "located" wherever their TLD
145. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGY AGE 24
(4th ed. 2007).
146. Struve & Wagner, supra note 142, at 1022-24.
147. Id. at 1023.
148. Id. at 992.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1027.
151. 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984). The "Calder effects test," as it is more commonly known,
was developed to address whether the minimum contacts standard had been satisfied in a
particular instance. Allen, supra note 116, at 294-95.
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registry is located should be entitled to less deference because
Congress fails to provide a clear justification for this choice.
However, even if one is comfortable with both the fact that
domain names are property and with the location Congress has
picked, it is still difficult to determine how best to regulate them. If
one accepts the proposition that domain names are akin to
trademarks, insofar as intellectual property rights inhere in each,
does it naturally follow that domain names should be subject to the
same regulatory scheme as trademarks? Trademarks have been
around for quite some time, but the Internet and the regulation
thereof are still in their infancy, comparatively speaking. The
essential question is whether traditional rules of contract law,
property law, trademark law, copyright law, etc. apply "as is" to the
Internet or whether the Internet is sufficiently different that it
requires unique rules and a unique regulatory framework.
The foregoing question typifies the debate between
exceptionalists and unexceptionalists. 152 The unexceptionalist believes
that traditional law should govern whenever new legal challenges
arise and that there is no need to complicate the law further by
increasing specialization. 153  The propensity towards distilling
individual legal specialties into entirely new and discrete areas of law
"is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles." 154 On the
other hand, the exceptionalist argues that there is something
fundamentally different about the Internet that evades regulation
through traditional means. 155 The exceptionalist believes that the so-
called "Law of the Horse" is appropriate in the context of the Internet
because the Internet defies all of our previous regulatory schemes that
depend on law, markets, social norms, and territory to regulate
effectively. 156
Scholars who have explored the constitutionality of the ACPA's
in rem provisions through exceptionalist points of view disagree
vehemently with their unexceptionalist counterparts. 157 The optimal
152. Johnson & Post, supra note 23, at 1376.
153. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207, 208 (arguing that there is no need to establish a separate body of law for the Internet).
154. Id. at 207. 'The Law of the Horse" refers to what Easterbrook believes to be
unnecessary complexity and specialization within the law, using "horses" to represent all of the
potential areas of law that could be developed. Easterbrook argues that because it would be
ridiculous to establish a distinct body of horse-related law, we should use preexisting areas of
law instead (property law, contract law, etc.) to deal with all horse issues. Id. at 207-08.
155. See Post, supra note 24 (describing the "exceptionalist" view).
156. Lessig, supra note 26, at 507-08.
157. Compare Jason W. Callen, Comment, Asserting In Personam Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Cybersquatters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1837, 1840 (2002) (espousing the rather unexceptionalist
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solution, however, may be a compromise: combine traditional concepts
of regulation with "The Law of the Horse."158 This Note elaborates
upon this possible solution in Part IV, but first, it is necessary to
analyze the existing ACPA jurisprudence to illustrate why the ACPA's
provision for in rem jurisdiction is unconstitutional. Specifically, there
are two overarching problems with the ACPA's in rem provision: (1) it
is, by definition, impossible to have a situation in which in rem
jurisdiction under the ACPA is both available and consistent with due
process, and courts that have found the in rem provision
constitutional have ignored the plain language and the reasoning
behind Shaffer; and (2) the ACPA's in rem provision effectively
transforms U.S. trademark law into the trademark law "of the global
Internet."'159 Further discussion of each of these problems follows.
B. The Constitutionality (or Lack Thereof) of the ACPA's In Rem
Provision: The "Legal Fiction"
Much of the earliest personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in the
United States was based on the idea that jurisdiction follows
geography. Pennoyer v. Neff ("Pennoyer") established the three types of
personal jurisdiction that courts still use: in personam, in rem, and
quasi in rem.160  Nevertheless, Pennoyer is most notable for
establishing that "[tihe power of a state to issue a binding judgment
[is] confined to persons or property found within its borders."'
61
However, personal jurisdiction changed markedly with
International Shoe's recognition that irrespective of a defendant's
state of residence, he or she nevertheless may have sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state such that maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. 162 This holding and subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence
viewpoint that traditional methods of personal jurisdiction are more adept than ACPA), with
Note, A "Category-Specific" Legislative Approach to the Internet Personal Jurisdiction Problem in
U.S. Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1617, 1617 (2004) (positing that a category-specific approach to
personal jurisdiction can be specially formatted to address the jurisdiction problems with the
Internet).
158. Easterbrook, supra note 153, at 207.
159. Steven J. Coran, Note, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act's In Rem
Provision: Making American Trademark Law the Law of the Internet?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 169,
188 (2001).
160. 95 U.S. 714, 727, 731 (1877). For a complete explanation of the different types of in rem
jurisdiction, see the discussion of Cnnews.com, supra Section II.D.3.
161. Allen, supra note 116, at 256.
162. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see supra Section II.B (providing an overview of U.S. personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence).
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indicate that the most important factor in establishing personal
jurisdiction was whether or not the defendant had engaged in some
sort of unilateral action so as to "purposefully avail" himself of the
forum state. 163 "[T]he more voluntary a defendant's connections to the
forum, the more likely it was that jurisdiction was proper under the
Constitution."
' 164
In the years since International Shoe, the Supreme Court
essentially has remained true to the minimum contacts test as its
touchstone for finding personal jurisdiction. Shaffer neither
augmented nor diminished International Shoe. Instead, Shaffer
merely made explicit what ought to have been implicit in the
International Shoe decision: the minimum contacts test from
International Shoe applies to "all assertions of state court
jurisdiction."165 Although Shaffer's language specifically mentions
state courts, 166  personal jurisdiction, unlike subject matter
jurisdiction, does not change when one switches from state to federal
court. In both judicial systems, personal jurisdiction depends on the
geography of the person or property at issue. There is nothing unique
about the federal court system that leads to the conclusion that the
Shaffer holding was intended to apply only to state courts to the
exclusion of federal courts. The reference to "state courts" most likely
is a product of the fact that the underlying action in Shaffer originated
in Delaware state court. 167 Therefore, the most logical reading of this
language is that International Shoe's minimum contacts test applies to
all assertions of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, any other construction
of this part of the opinion is myopic and distorts the plain meaning of
the Supreme Court's language.
However, several courts have read Shaffer's minimum contacts
analysis more narrowly. Because Shaffer dealt with the quasi in rem
II variety of personal jurisdiction,16 8 some courts-most notably the
courts in Harrods and Cnnews-have interpreted Shaffer's directive
about "all assertions of state court jurisdiction" as applying only to
quasi in rem II actions.1 69 Other courts have attempted to relegate the
163. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
164. Allen, supra note 116, at 257-58.
165. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 186.
168. Id. For a discussion of in rem jurisdiction, see supra Section II.D.3.
169. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212; see, e.g., Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302
F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002) (opining that, despite Shaffer's directive that the minimum contacts test
should apply to all in rem actions, the Court intended for the minimum contacts analysis to
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Shaffer language about personal jurisdiction to the realm of "non-
binding dicta" insofar as it applied to " 'true' in rem actions not then
before the court."
170
Such a constrained reading of Shaffer, however, runs entirely
contrary to the rationale behind the Court's holding. The opinion's
strong language indicates that the Supreme Court favors substance
over form:
The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of
jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial
modern justification. Its continued acceptance would serve only to allow state-court
jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant. We therefore conclude that
all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set
forth in International Shoe and its progeny. 
1 7 1
The Supreme Court implicitly reiterated this preference for
substance over form in another seminal personal jurisdiction case,
Burnham v. Superior Court.1 72 Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the
distinction between resident and nonresident defendants is a very
important one, because the Court's "tradition has treated the two
classes of defendants quite differently, and it is unreasonable to read
Shaffer as casually obliterating that distinction." 173 Justice Scalia
maintained that the focus should not be upon "whether a separate
Latin label is attached to one particular basis of contact," because
personal jurisdiction "based upon a 'property ownership' contact and
by definition unaccompanied by personal, in-state service, must
satisfy the litigation-relatedness requirement of International
Shoe."'74 Justice William Brennan's concurrence in Burnham is
equally enlightening because although he admitted that Shaffer's
"technical holding" was limited to quasi in rem jurisdiction, the
analytical framework was not. 175
Taken together, these opinions indicate that the Court wished
to infuse some degree of flexibility into the due process analysis of
personal jurisdiction. That is, the Constitution "requires notice that is
'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action,' " and as far as the
notice requirement, "the Court has made it absolutely clear that the
apply only to quasi in rem II actions); Cable News Network L.P. v. Cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d
484 (E.D. Va. 2001) (same).
170. Callen, supra note 157, at 1852 (citing Cnnews.com I, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 491).
171. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added).
172. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
173. Id. at 621.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 630 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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traditional Latin label of an action does not matter."176 Finding
otherwise would essentially mean that calling an action in rem has
nothing to do with notice requirements but everything to do with
personal jurisdiction,' 77 a proposition akin to saying that the rules of
football apply to the scoring of the game but not to the outcome. A
much better reading of International Shoe, Shaffer, and subsequent
decisions is that the Supreme Court gradually has abrogated the
formalistic distinctions between personal jurisdiction classifications in
favor of a more flexible approach that considers the defendant's
contacts with the forum and the burden upon him or her of litigating
in that forum. Interpreting the case law differently places too much
emphasis upon centuries-old classifications that simply are not
capable of dealing with modern forms of property.
The argument that the minimum contacts test should look "not
to the contacts of the absent registrant to the forum, but rather to the
contacts of the property to the forum," is even more enigmatic. 78 This
approach, taken from Harrods, is particularly puzzling because "if the
analysis actually focused on property instead of a person... much
modern jurisdictional doctrine would be nonsense."'179 It is quite
comical to attempt to determine whether a piece of property has
"purposefully availed" itself of the forum 80 such that it may
"reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."18' Much of the
Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence involves an
element of intent (e.g., purposeful availment), and it is impossible to
ascribe intent to a piece of property without anthropomorphizing it.
These issues, while extreme and somewhat illogical, illustrate
the problem with examining the contacts of the property with the
forum state, rather than examining the contacts of the property owner
with the forum state. The entire purpose of an ACPA action is to
determine whether the registrant's registration of a domain name is
lawful, but enforcement of an ACPA in rem action requires a court
either to pretend that the registrant's personal rights are not at stake,
or to focus solely upon the contacts of the property itself with the
forum, thus "leading to the same unrealistic result."'8 2 This approach,
176. Allen, supra note 116, at 263 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 312-14 (1950)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 264 (citing Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 224 (4th
Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added).
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
181. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
182. Id. at 271-72.
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like the adherence to Latin labels, is outmoded and misses the point of
Shaffer. If the Harrods court's approach were correct, it would render
the Shaffer decision entirely superfluous. If the question were framed
in terms of whether the property itself had minimum contacts with
the forum in which it is, by definition, located, there would be nothing
further to the inquiry: it would be impossible for property ever to lack
minimum contacts with the forum. 183 The property will always have
minimum contacts with the forum in which it is located, so there is no
need for additional inquiry if the only concern is the property's
contacts. The property has nothing at stake in the litigation, however,
so the focus should be upon the property owner's contacts with the
forum state. That the property has minimum contacts with the forum
in which it is located is a foregone conclusion, and it does violence to
Shaffer to impart such meaning to its holding.
The logical conclusion, then-that the ACPA's in rem provision
is unconstitutional-flows easily from a juxtaposition of International
Shoe and Shaffer. International Shoe requires minimum contacts with
the forum state "such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 184 It has long
been accepted that the minimum contacts test applies to in personam
jurisdiction, and if minimum contacts cannot be found, in personam
jurisdiction is unconstitutional. 185 Closer analysis of Shaffer's holding
makes explicit what already was implicit: all assertions of
jurisdiction-not just in personam jurisdiction-must comply with
International Shoe's minimum contacts test.' 86 However, the ACPA
allows for in rem jurisdiction only when the plaintiff "is not able to
obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would have been a
defendant,"'187 or is unable to find or serve such a defendant. 88 In rem
jurisdiction under the ACPA is only available when in personam
jurisdiction would violate due process. However, Shaffer makes clear
that both in rem and in personam jurisdiction are to be evaluated by
the International Shoe minimum contacts standard. The inescapable
conclusion is that the in rem provision is an attempt by Congress to
circumvent International Shoe, and thereby, due process. The ACPA
confers jurisdiction where due process forbids it. For that reason, it is
unconstitutional.
183. Id. at 264-65.
184. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
185. Id.
186. 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2000).
188. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
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It is important to note (as did the Shaffer Court) that in many
cases, the distinctions between property and property owner, and
between in rem and in personam, will be irrelevant because,
depending on the property at issue and its uses, its mere presence in a
state often will be sufficient for minimum contacts. 189 However, this
fact does not render the ACPA's in rem provision completely
innocuous, especially where domain names are concerned. "Most
courts hold that mere registration with a forum domain authority...
does not establish minimum contacts."190 In the case of domain name
registration, the "owners" of the domain names usually do not
purposefully seek to avail themselves of the forum state; they may not
even be aware that their property has passed into the forum state. For
example, a defendant who registers with a registrar in California will
have no notice that the ACPA considers his domain name to be
"located" in Virginia. 191 Moreover, the mere presence of a contract and
periodic payments between the registrant and the registry does not
create minimum contacts. 192 Therefore, although the distinction
between the minimum contacts of the property owner and the contacts
of the property itself may not matter in many cases, the in rem
provision potentially could have (and indeed, already has had, as
GlobalSantaFe and Cnnews demonstrate) a harmful effect upon the
regulation of domain names.
Finally, it is worth noting that not only has the presence of this
in rem provision led to "bad law"1 93 in the form of questionable
rationalizations from courts, but it also has retarded significantly the
development of personal jurisdiction law. 194 Because several courts
have been seduced by the availability of in rem jurisdiction under the
ACPA, they have resisted (to the detriment of the development of the
law) efforts to modify and expand personal jurisdiction in ways that
might simultaneously be more compatible with due process and more
adaptable to the Internet and the unique challenges it presents.
189. 433 U.S. at 207-08.
190. Callen, supra note 157, at 1855.
191. Id. at 1857-58.
192. Id. at 1858-59.
193. Allen, supra note 116, at 246.
194. Id. at 297.
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C. Making U.S. Trademark Law the Law of the "Global Internet"'195
Although the inherent unconstitutionality of the in rem
provision is reason enough to eliminate it, there is one additional
concern associated with its continued existence: aggressive
enforcement of this provision effectively imposes U.S. trademark law
upon the world. In addition to the comity problems presented by this
imposition, the United States's own commerce interests could be
damaged severely if the rest of the world decided that the United
States attempted to monopolize trademark law when it enacted the
ACPA. As mentioned in Part II, the GlobalSantaFe court expressly
recognized that overly aggressive application of the ACPA's in rem
provision to extraterritorial defendants could lead to a backlash,
resulting in the fragmentation of the DNS or possibly the development
of competing systems. 196 Recognizing that the United States arguably
"stands to lose the most from the segmentation of the domain name
system," scholars have cautioned that the United States "should
pursue international coordination of domain names [sic] regulation,
rather than the extensive assertion of jurisdiction found in the
ACPA."'197 Otherwise, the ACPA runs the risk of globalizing U.S.
trademark law.
This would be quite problematic because the United States's
central philosophy behind trademark protection differs from that of
most nations. In particular, the United States places a premium not
only upon registration of the mark, but also upon use of the mark in
commerce.198  Conversely, because most other nations consider
registration of a mark to be sufficient, 199 application of U.S. trademark
law to a citizen of a registration-based system would be an unwieldy
juxtaposition at best. Therefore, the differences between the
trademark laws in the United States and those of most other countries
create additional comity problems. One need not look far to find the
potential conflicts between these two systems. For instance, if domain
names are akin to trademarks, does registration of the domain name
itself constitute "use"? If so, "what is the geographic scope of use when
a mark is used as a domain name ... ?"200 Or, to look at the issue
differently, if a citizen of a registration-based country has a registered
195. Coran, supra note 159, at 188 (arguing that "making U.S. mark law the mark law of the
global Internet ... should not be allowed to stand").
196. 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 623-24 (E.D. Va. 2003).
197. Struve & Wagner, supra note 142, at 993.
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mark in that country, and a U.S. citizen subsequently uses that mark
as part of his domain name, is the U.S. user violating the foreign
registrant's trademark rights? 20 1 Indeed, the only possible way to
protect a mark in every country is to register and use it in every
country, 20 2 which would be prohibitively expensive and time-
consuming.
Ultimately, the unacceptable consequence of the ACPA's in rem
provision is that "any person who registers a domain name with a
domain registry that is located in the United States could potentially
lose that website," which undoubtedly poses some comity problems.
203
Rather than risk alienating other countries by subjecting their citizens
to U.S. trademark law, the United States should remove the in rem
provision from the ACPA. This approach also would protect U.S.
commercial interests by lowering the risk of fragmentation of the
DNS. When added to the demonstrated unconstitutionality of the in
rem provision, the broad sweep of the trademark enforcement dooms
the ACPA's legitimacy unless the in rem provision is removed.204
Determining that this provision is unconstitutional and unwise
does not end the inquiry, however, for it does not adequately address
the problem of foreign cybersquatters ostensibly beyond the reach of
U.S. courts. However, this Note argues that the best solution to this
problem can be achieved by combining existing remedies and modes of
establishing personal jurisdiction. In particular, a combination of
International Shoe's minimum contacts test, the Calder effects test,
and the ACPA without the in rem provision would have virtually the
same level of effectiveness against foreign cybersquatters as the
ACPA's in rem provision does, but this combination would avoid
constitutional and comity problems associated with the provision.
IV. OUT WITH THE NEW AND IN WITH THE OLD
In a nutshell, Congress attempted to fix that which was not
broken when it enacted the ACPA and included the in rem provision.
The ACPA itself-without the offending provision-is an important
piece of legislation that represents Congress's prescient attempt to
keep pace with the rapidly changing world of Internet regulation.
Congress was wise to enact the ACPA, recognizing that neither the
201. Id.
202. Id. at 193.
203. Id. at 191.
204. See, e.g., Callen, supra note 157, at 1855 ("[T]he in rem provision is severable. The
remaining provisions of the ACPA authorizing in personam actions would continue to operate as
a fully functioning law.").
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United States nor, indeed, the rest of the world can rely solely on self-
regulation to guide the growth of the Internet.2 5 However, Congress
overreached when it added the provision for in rem jurisdiction, not
only because it is unwise and unconstitutional, but also because it is
unnecessary. Although it may seem deceptively simple, combining the
International Shoe minimum contacts standard with the Calder
effects test (where necessary) provides the only basis needed for
personal jurisdiction in actions against foreign cybersquatters. Such a
jurisdictional test, albeit far from revolutionary or radical, has the
advantage of already widespread approval, simplicity, and
predictability, the importance of which cannot be underestimated in
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. 2 6 When the law is clear and the
consequences predictable, "the defendant's liberty is preserved
because he is allowed to make behavioral decisions with the most
complete view of the possible consequences of those decisions."
20 7
In addition to achieving these goals of simplicity and
predictability, the optimal solution would effectuate the strong
preference of U.S. courts for adjudicating matters on the merits
instead of on procedural grounds, and it would preserve adversarial
dispute resolution-another hallmark of U.S. jurisprudence. 208 The
solution to problems of personal jurisdiction over cybersquatters
should be as unobtrusive as possible. With these goals in mind, this
Note proposes that International Shoe should be the controlling
analysis, augmented by the Calder effects test when necessary.
20 9
Whenever International Shoe's minimum contacts test is sufficient to
make a well-reasoned judgment as to personal jurisdiction, it should
be used to make that determination. However, when more clarity is
needed, courts should utilize the Calder framework, explained below.
205. It should be noted that some scholars bristle when confronted with the proposition that
the Internet needs anything more than self-regulation. For more on this contrasting view, see
Johnson & Post, supra note 23, at 1367.
206. Indeed, simplicity and predictability ought to be omnipresent when fashioning a
solution to any sort of personal jurisdiction problem, particularly as they relate to the burden
upon a litigant in defending against an action in the forum. Allen, supra note 116, at 281-85.
207. Id. at 277.
208. See id. at 275 ("In such an adversary system, it is more likely that disputes will be
resolved on the merits if a defendant appears and, once there, has the real ability to mount an
effective defense.").
209. Many scholars have argued that Calder is sufficient as a stand-alone mode of analysis
for personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 116, at 294-95 (asserting that the test
articulated in Calder "seems almost to be designed to deal with a classic case of cybersquatting");
Struve & Wagner, supra note 142, at 1002-03 (arguing that when a registrant intends to cause
an effect within the United States, that registrant has created contacts sufficient for purposes of
personal jurisdiction); cf. Callen, supra note 157, at 1839 (arguing that Calder plus FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(k)(2) will always be sufficient to establish in personam jurisdiction).
[Vol. 61:6:18611896
IF THE SHOE FITS
It bears repeating that, in many cases involving tangible
property located within the forum, there is jurisdiction over both the
property and the property owner, regardless of the standard applied.
Therefore, this solution is directed primarily at intangible property, or
property whose location is otherwise indeterminate, absent an
arbitrary legislative declaration as to its location (to wit, domain
names). Many foreign cybersquatters lack minimum contacts and
probably would not be subject to minimum contacts-based jurisdiction
alone. 210 Moreover, mere domain name registration does not create the
requisite minimum contacts, as explained in Part III. Therefore,
Calder is ideal for analyzing an action involving intangible property
like a domain name, which requires a more searching inquiry to
determine personal jurisdiction.
The Calder effects test stands for the proposition that a
defendant who never entered the forum can nevertheless be subject to
jurisdiction if: (1) the defendant committed an intentional act (2)
expressly aimed at the forum, (3) which the defendant knew would
cause harm and did, in fact, cause harm, the brunt of which was felt in
the forum. 211 In Calder, the Supreme Court held that a Florida
defendant over whom California lacked minimum contacts-based
jurisdiction nevertheless had sufficient contacts with California
because of "intentional conduct in Florida calculated to cause injury to
respondent in California."212 Because of its emphasis on the focal point
of the harm, the Calder effects test "seems almost to be designed" to
deal with jurisdiction over cybersquatters.
21 3
Proving cybersquatting and cyberpiracy, as they are defined in
the ACPA, requires a showing of bad-faith intent to profit, which
satisfies the first prong of the Calder test. 214 Because they have acted
intentionally, cybersquatters invariably are aware that the domain
names they have registered are connected with famous U.S.
trademarks, thereby satisfying the second prong of the test. Although
it is possible for one inadvertently to register a domain name identical
to a famous trademark, a cybersquatter's intentional act of registering
a domain name connected with a famous U.S. trademark is, by
210. Callen, supra note 157, at 1850. It should be pointed out that Callen argues that foreign
cybersquatters lack minimum contacts because they lack minimum contacts with "any one
state." Id. In other words, Callen believes that the downfall of the minimum contacts test in this
area is due to the fact that a cybersquatter has minimum contacts simultaneously with every
state and no state-a proposition that this Note does not advocate.
211. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).
212. Id. at 791.
213. Allen, supra note 116, at 295.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
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definition, aimed at the trademark holder in an attempt to extort
money. If someone has a legitimate, good faith reason for registering a
domain name, his usage of that domain name is not cybersquatting.
215
Most of the time, however, prior registration of a domain name
connected with a famous mark is anything but coincidental. Neither is
a cybersquatter absolved by not knowing the exact location of the
plaintiff in the United States. Knowing that his domain name
registration infringes upon a famous U.S. mark is sufficient to "aim" a
cybersquatter's action at the forum. Finally, the third prong is
satisfied easily because the one and only goal of a cybersquatter is to
cause harm to the trademark holder in the form of initial interest
confusion, loss of brand name recognition, and revenue loss that
results when people are unable to locate the holder's website. The
cybersquatter knows and intends for this harm to occur to the plaintiff
and ultimately hopes that the plaintiff will attempt to buy back the
domain name.
Thus, the Calder effects test almost always will provide an
aegis under which a court can find minimum contacts over a foreign
cybersquatter, even when the cybersquatter has not yet attempted to
extort money out of the trademark holder. Indeed, when the
cybersquatter has attempted such extortion, the Calder analysis
probably is no longer necessary, considering that the cybersquatter
would then have a much more direct contact with the forum.
Additionally, the use of the Calder effects test alleviates another
potential harm that could arise from widespread assertion of in rem
jurisdiction based on the location of the TLD registry: the risk that the
proliferation of such actions will overburden the courts in the Eastern
District of Virginia, the district in which VeriSign is located.216
Although it is debatable whether there ever would be such a
tremendous influx of actions against cybersquatters that would
overburden the court system, such a concern need not ever be tested
under the Calder effects test; the courts that have jurisdiction are
those in districts in which the plaintiffs are located, allocating the
"burden" much more evenly.
215. However, even when the prior registrant has a legitimate reason for registering the
domain name, he nevertheless may be called upon to defend his claim to the domain name when
confronted by the more famous holder of the mark. See Complaint at 2-4, 7-8, Keith Lionel
Urban v. Keith Urban, No. 07CV0018 (M.D. Tenn. filed Feb. 2, 2007), 2007 WL 521877. In this
highly publicized case, the country singer, Keith Lionel Urban, is suing Keith Urban, a New
Jersey resident and painter who maintains the website <www.keithurban.com.>. Because the
New Jersey Urban has a legitimate claim to the domain name (i.e., his name is Keith Urban), he
cannot be said to be a cybersquatter; the country singer Urban's complaint, however, is based on
alleged misrepresentations on the New Jersey Urban's website. Id. at 4.
216. Note, supra note 157, at 1631.
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Because this Note's solution is a m6lange of different remedies,
it is debatable whether this is an exceptionalist or an unexceptionalist
stance on solving the problem of cybersquatting. Ultimately, its
position is a synthesis of both, insofar as it draws upon the time-tested
formula from International Shoe, embraces the substance of the
ACPA, and eschews the rigid formalistic approach that has been a
hallmark of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence for many years.
Indeed, it seems that an approach combining elements of
exceptionalist and unexceptionalist doctrine often works well in the
context of Internet legal challenges; the Internet itself can be viewed
as a juxtaposition of the old and the new.217 Further, Internet
regulation is much more successful when it avoids rigid, formalistic
classifications such as in rem versus in personam, or exceptionalist
versus unexceptionalist. As a threshold matter, therefore, it is of little
consequence whether this solution is more aligned with exceptionalist
or unexceptionalist viewpoints. What matters most is formulating a
solution that addresses the legal and policy goals of Internet
regulation while providing the requisite flexibility that will make the
solution useful for many years. The combination of the International
Shoe minimum contacts test and the Calder effects test results in just
such a solution.
This solution could be criticized as unduly complicated.
Opponents might argue that a test for personal jurisdiction that
combines two different approaches runs the risk of becoming unwieldy
and unnecessarily complex. However, Internet law is an area in which
flexibility must be paramount. Because the Internet is growing and
changing constantly, the methods for evaluating and regulating the
Internet need to be likewise adaptable to the dynamic nature of the
medium. The juxtaposition of the International Shoe minimum
contacts test with the Calder effects test provides a much-needed
measure of flexibility because it allows courts to adapt their personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence to the particular facts at issue in a given
lawsuit. When the minimum contacts test is sufficient to analyze
personal jurisdiction, it alone can be used. When, however, the facts
demand a different type of analysis, courts can perform the Calder
effects test to determine whether a party has sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum so as to make personal jurisdiction
appropriate.
217. Although the Internet and the technology upon which it is based continually evolve, the
basic principles of the Internet and its architecture remain the same. It is easy to imagine that
the original creators of the Internet scarcely could have fathomed the uses to which it is put




Moreover, if courts were to heed this Note's suggestions and
adopt the proffered juxtaposition of the minimum contacts test and
the Calder effects test, the complexities likely could be alleviated by a
clever court's articulation of the tests in a precedential opinion that
unifies the two approaches. In other words, if a court were to issue an
opinion in which it combines the two tests into one, practitioners and
scholars alike would be able to rely upon a unitary set of guidelines
codified within such a ruling. Part-and-parcel of this plan, however, is
the need for excising the in rem provision from the ACPA. Until the
offending provision is removed or declared unconstitutional, it is the
law by which courts will continue to be bound.
V. CONCLUSION
The changes advocated by this Note have the potential to
positively influence and strengthen personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence, especially as it concerns personal jurisdiction over
foreign cybersquatters. What remains to be seen is whether Congress
and the federal courts will pay attention to the steadily growing
clamor of those seeking an end to the ACPA's provision for in rem
jurisdiction. The premise upon which this Note is based-that the in
rem provision of the ACPA is unconstitutional-is not unique to this
Note. Almost immediately after the ACPA's enactment in 1999,
scholars and theorists began expressing dissatisfaction with its liberal
approach to personal jurisdiction. The specific solution this Note
proposes, however, has significant potential to advance personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence because of the solution's pragmatism and
staying power.
The solution proffered, although it is flexible, could be criticized
as unduly complicated. While a juxtaposition of two different (but
related) approaches is less than ideal, it is worth remembering that
the Calder effects test, at its core, is merely an elaboration upon the
principles of International Shoe. Calder is especially apposite in the
context of domain name jurisdiction because the effects test is a
particular iteration of International Shoe that will prove most apt in
the area of Internet jurisdiction. Moreover, because the International
Shoe minimum contacts test is more than sixty years old, all persons
subject to U.S. personal jurisdiction already are on constructive notice
of its terms. Thus, this solution possesses the necessary degree of
flexibility to accommodate future jurisdictional issues while
preserving the stability and predictability of the present jurisdictional
framework.
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The ACPA cannot be reconciled with due process because of its
slavish adherence to form over substance, which is entirely contrary to
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. In particular, the in
rem provision of the ACPA specifically allows for personal jurisdiction
over the domain name itself in situations where the alleged
cybersquatter lacks minimum contacts with the forum state. Such an
approach not only confuses the interests of the property itself with the
interests of the property owner, but it also disavows important
Supreme Court precedent. International Shoe established, and Shaffer
reaffirmed, that the minimum contacts test applies to all analyses of
personal jurisdiction. As a result, the ACPA's provision allowing for in
rem jurisdiction in the absence of minimum contacts is contrary to the
entire weight of the Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The in
rem provision, then, violates due process and should be overturned as
unconstitutional. Moreover, aggressive use of this provision could
result in serious consequences for the United States, including a
potential fragmentation of the domain name system that could result
from a backlash against an attempt by the United States to impose its
trademark law on the world.
The fact that the ACPA's in rem provision is both unwise and
unconstitutional is not its only shortcoming; the provision also is
unnecessary. In place of the in rem provision, the courts should adopt
a scheme that adequately addresses the problem of personal
jurisdiction over foreign cybersquatters. This Note proffers a solution
that combines two tests for personal jurisdiction that have withstood
the test of time: the International Shoe minimum contacts test and the
Calder effects test. By using the latter to supplement the former when
necessary (and it will be necessary in most actions involving foreign
cybersquatters), this solution is as simple and predictable as it is
flexible, all of which are paramount goals in any personal jurisdiction
analysis.
The essence of this solution is that society and the law must be
willing to adapt to the various regulatory challenges that the Internet
presents. By now, it is clear that the Internet is here to stay, and it
likely is impossible for one nation to rule the Internet (or any aspect
thereof) with an iron fist. There is ample evidence that attempts to
constrain the Internet will be utterly futile as long as there is at least
one determined Internet user opposed to such attempts. As a case in
point, consider the Recording Industry Association of America's battle
against file sharing. For every file-sharing system that is shut down,
ten more arise, poised to operate in the same milieu as their departed
counterparts. The keys to successful Internet regulation, therefore,
are flexibility and international cooperation.
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Although it may be impossible to impose any comprehensive
regulatory scheme upon the Internet or activities conducted therein,
the approaches with the best chance of success are those that
recognize not only that the Internet presents unprecedented legal
challenges, but also that successful Internet regulation will require an
equal-if not greater-amount of legal creativity. In this case, that
creativity should manifest itself as a return to the basics of personal
jurisdiction in the familiar form of the International Shoe test.
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